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Inaccessible apexes: Comparing

access to regional human rights
courts and commissions in
Europe, the Americas, and Africa
Franqoise Hampson,* Claudia Martin,** and
Frans Viljoen***

The three well-established regional human rights systems (in Europe, the Americas, and
Africa) aim to provide access to individuals to a decision and remedy based on the violation
of human rights in the founding treaties. In this article, the notion of the "dispute pyramid,"
developed in sociolegal studies, generally, is adjustedto describe and help us better understand
regional access. Access differs considerably across the three systems, and its major stumbling
blocks present themselves at different stages. In the Europeansystem, most cases are dismissed
at the admissibilityphase. In the Inter-American system, most cases are weeded out at the preadmissibility phase, by the Commission's Secretariat.In the African system, the greatestconstraint to regional access lies in the small number of cases decided domestically. The general
trend toward judicialization,observed in all three systems, does not necessarily imply greater
access. In order to overcome the impediments to access at the domestic level, quasi-judicialbodies-cultivating rights awarenessand understanding-stillhave a role to play.

1. Introduction
An important feature of the three well-established regional human rights systems is
their common aim of providing access to individuals to a decision and remedy based
on the violation of human rights within member states. Access to a system's remedial promise may be limited due to deficiencies at the domestic level (thus inhibiting the submission of cases from the start) and to practices within regional bodies,
such as excessive administrative culling, overly strict application of admissibility
*

Emeritus Professor, School of Law, University of Essex. Email: fhampsonTessex.ac.uk

**

Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and Professorial Lecturer in
Residence, American University Washington College of Law. Email: cmartindwc.american.edu.
Director of the Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria. Email: frans.viljoen@
up.ac.za.

*

doi: 10.109 3/icon/moyOO7

162

I-CON 16 (2018),161 186

requirements, or a reluctance of quasi-judicial bodies to refer cases to judicial bodies. Our study of access to the supervisory machinery of these systems ("regional
justice") aims to identify the particular bottlenecks that obstruct access in each of
the systems, to explore reasons for any variances, and to derive insights that may
improve access to regional justice. Increasing judicialization is a common feature
of the three systems. This contribution also reflects on the implications for regional
acces of this trend.
Our article is limited in three significant respects: (i) It focuses on applications, communications, petitions, complaints, or cases (to which we refer as "cases"), submitted by individuals (or groups of individuals) and not interstate cases. Interstate cases
are extremely rare'; and admissibility criteria for interstate cases differ from those in
respect to individual cases. (ii) It discusses contentious cases, and does not extend
to the advisory role of institutions in these systems. (iii) It also does not encompass
2
access to interim (precautionary or provisional) measures.
In Europe, a single judicial institution, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), established under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), has been in place since 1998. The Court's
caseload is staggering.3 In 2014, the ECtHR allocated 56,250 new applications to its
three "judicial formations."4 It finalized 86,063 cases, with either a judgment (on
the merits) or a decision (on inadmissibility or to strike out).5 Still, a huge backlog
remains, leading to significant delays in finalizing cases. However, as will be more fully
discussed below, only a very small percentage of cases culminate in a remedial order
by the ECtHR.
In the Inter-American system, a dual system, comprising the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR), is in place. Here too, petitions are numerous but do not nearly reach
European levels. In 2014, the IACHR received 1,758 petitions but approved only
forty-seven decisions on admissibility, referred nineteen cases to the IACtHR, and
issued three merits decisions. 6 The IACtHR in 2014 delivered sixteen judgments on

2

3

A handful in the European system (see, e.g., recent cases, Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/14, and
Ukraine v. Russia II, App. No. 43800/14); two cases before the Inter-American system, one rejected by the
IACHR (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case No. 1/2006, Report No. 11/07 (Mar. 7, 2007)) and one
declared admissible and currently under processing (Franldin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador v. Colombia,
Inter-State Petition W-02,Admissibility (Oct. 21,2010)); and only one in the African system (DRC v. Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda (2004) Afr. Hum. Rts. L. Rep. 19 (ACHPR 2003), decided by the ACHPR.
While the importance of and need for access to these measures is undeniable, the issues arising from
these measures are quite distinct, and are much more pronounced in the Inter-American than in the
other two systems. This assertion is based on the observation of the practice of all three systems, though
so far no specific study exists documenting this practice.
Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats-annual_2014_ENG.pdf (last visited February 15,

2018).
4

Id.
Id.
Available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html (last visited February 15,
2018). The IACHR received 504 requests for precautionary measures but granted only 33.
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the merits. 7 Obviously, also in this system access to the highest form of remedy, an
order of the IACtHR, is very rare. Although the IACHR has a mandate under both the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (with respect to all OAS member states) and the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) (with respect to
state parties thereto), this contribution looks only into its Convention-based mandate.
In Africa, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) has
been in place since 1987, and with the election of the first eleven Judges in 2006,
the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR) has been introduced.
Compared to the other two systems, a handful of cases have been submitted to the
Commission and Court. In almost a quarter of a decade, the ACHPR has only handled
a total of 442 individual communications, of which 361 have been finalizedS This
number is a drop in the ocean, considering the pool of potential cases. It must be abundantly clear that some seventeen cases per year, in a vast continent comprising fiftyfour state parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (AChHPR),
is an unacceptably low caseload. By the end of 2015, the ACtHPR had issued four
judgments on the merits and three on provisional measures.9
While numbers may impress, we caution against any conclusion that more is necessarily better. Rather, we try to explore the specific features of each of the systems that
account for the various figures, while highlighting implications for access. In this contribution, access is considered along two axes: (1) access to what? (2) access by whom?
Clearly, access to redress-the ability to participate effectively in the process whereby
a remedy is identified-is also crucial, and linked to these issues. However, the issue of
access to particular forms of redress falls outside the scope of this article.

2. Access to what?
Access to the regional machinery depends on first clearing the domestic hurdle, that
is, seeking redress before domestic courts. Once this barrier has been negotiated,
the case still has to proceed through the largely bureaucratized administrative preadmissibility phase, before it may eventually reach the relevant Commission or Court,
for consideration of admissibility. Access to a decision on the merits may result in a
quasi-judicial or judicial decision, depending on whether the case ends up before a
Commission, or a Court, if a two-tiered system is in place. The possibility of friendly
settlement, and its implications for access, is also considered.

7

The IACtHR delivered thirteen judgments deciding the objections and merits of contentious cases, and

9

three interpretative judgments; it further issued seven orders on monitoring compliance with judgment;
and adopted three new provisional measures. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual
Report 2014, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/ia2014/ingles/files/assets/conimon/downloads/publication.pdf.
See Commission's "Report on Communications" (ACHPR/53/OS/1204, presented at the Commission's
53rd ordinary session, April 2013, Banjul, The Gambia; by the end of 2012, the reported situation was
as follows: a total of 426 cases, of which only 210 had been completed (see Combined 32nd and 33rd
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human an Peoples' Rights, EX.CL/782(XXII) Rev. 2, 19).
Available at http://en.african-court.org/index.php/basic-documents#finalised-cases.
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2.1. Access to domestic courts
One of the main reasons for the limited regional access in most of Africa, in particular,
is the small size of the pool of potential cases to be submitted, due to a lack of access at
the domestic level. Regional access is propelled by the logic that regional mechanisms
only come into play when cases before domestic legal systems had been unsuccessful
in providing redress, as expressed in the exhaustion of the domestic remedies requirement. However, this logic falters if access to domestic remedies is illusory. Quite clearly,
it would be extraordinarily difficult to research and quantify the exact depth of the
pool of potential cases at the domestic level.'0 It is more feasible to identify the factors
impeding domestic access, which is attempted below. At the domestic level, only a fraction of potential "injurious experiences" ever end up as formally litigated claims."
Given the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies, any analysis of access to the
regional machinery ought also to include, as a first step, the question of the "legal"
awareness (or "rights literacy") of alleged victims. Access to justice at the national
level assumes a national legal culture in which at least some important wrongs are
conceived and pursued as justiciable human rights violations. However, in most of
Africa, and in at least some parts of Latin America, few people construct the injuries
or wrongs against them as "cases" involving a legal issue about which something can
be done. Where expectations of the rule of law and respect for human rights are low,
the response to a possible human rights violation may be a shrug of the shoulders as
"one of those things" or "only to be expected."
African "legal culture" is not particularly litigious. Many African societies are poised
between two cultural worlds, that of tradition (and recourse to political, diplomatic,
administrative, or traditional dispute settlement) and that of modernity (represented
by formalized Western courts).' 2 This duality leads not only to a bifurcated system
and divided loyalties but also to alienation due to the imposed nature of the lawand lawyer-dominated "adversarial legalism." In traditional societies where one's life
world is determined predominantly by kinship relationships, the likelihood of individual legal recourse is limited. In these societies, the notion of acceptance of the leader's
authority is still deep-seated, and he is viewed as "personification of the moral and
political order."' 3 For those remaining attached to this world view, the post-colonial
state is associated with performing this role, and should therefore not be confronted
for fear of destabilizing the very order of things. In addition, people feel alienated from
formal courts, which are seen as the preserve of a minority elite with proficiency in a
European language.
10 See William L. F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformationof Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming .. , 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 31 (1980/81); and Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know andDon't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 4 (1983).
Galanter, supranote 10, at 12.
2 Tom Bennet, Access to Justice and Human Rights in the TraditionalCourts of Sub-Saharan Africa, in AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVES
ON TRADITION AND JUSTICE 19, 34-38 (T. Bennett et al. eds., 2012).
E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, Chiefs and African States: Some Introductory Notes and an
Extensive Bibliography on African Chieftaincy, 25/26 J. LEGALPLURALISM
& UNOFFICIAL
L. 1 (1987).
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The next step is the decision of the victim that he or she wants to do something
about what has happened by getting a lawyer and by invoking the machinery of the
law involved. Numerous factors impede access to a lawyer and courts. The legal profession in Africa is underdeveloped, and lawyers are quite scarce.' 4 Accessing formal
legal processes is complex and requires professional intervention. Legal services are
professionalized, cumbersome, and culturally alienating, and the fees are out of the
reach of ordinary people. Pro bono legal services, which may serve as a safety net
against unaffordability, are largely absent in less developed countries and, in particular, rural areas. A weak and overcommitted civil society generally lacks the resources
to fill the gap. In most African societies, there are low literacy levels, in general, and
low levels of rights awareness and ignorance of rights-even at the national legal system, not to mention at the regional. Even if a victim can afford access to a lawyer, the
competence of that lawyer may be questionable.
A further step involves the need to institute domestic proceedings or appeal an
adverse domestic decision. The often crumbling infrastructure, lack of qualified administrative staff, and unmotivated judicial officers due to inadequate remuneration, leading to inertia and delays, frustrate even those who approach the formal domestic legal
system in their quest for justice. In authoritarian political dispensations, the prospects
of successful access to courts may be dim due to a lack of an independent judiciary, or
perception by nationals of corruption and that state organs routinely disregard judicial orders.
Once all these hurdles have been overcome but the case fails before a domestic
court, the case may still not become the subject of regional justice because it is not
re-imagined and re-constructed as a "regional case" due to a low level of awareness
or interest in the regional human rights system-not only among ordinary people but
also among lawyers.
Fair enough, these factors are not exclusive to Africa,' 5 and they also do not present themselves equally in Africa countries. Even if regional contexts differ, there are
parallels. In the European system, the access of particularly marginalized groups and
stigmatized minorities (Roma), battered women, and refugees is also seriously stifled,
starting at the domestic level. The cost of recourse to law has also become a vital element in access to the Strasbourg machinery' 6 Similar to the position in Africa, access
to justice in Latin America is not ensured to a large portion of the population-especially the poor-as many studies of the region's judicial systems show.' In spite of
ongoing judicial reforms, experts have consistently identified several obstacles as

14

See, e.g., N. A. Kahn-Fogel, The Troubling Shortage of African Lawyers: Examination of a Continental Crisis
Using Zambia as a CaseStudy, 33 PA. J. INT'L L. 719 (2012).
See, e.g., Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D.
L. REV. 466 (2014).
See Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, Judgment (Merits) (Oct. 9, 1979); Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 18139/91, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (July 13, 1995).

17

See Jose Thompson (coord.), ACCESOA

LA JIUSTICLA
Y EQUIDAD. ESTUDIOEN SIETE PAiSESDE AMEIcA LATINA,

BANco

INTERAMEICANO DE DESARROLLO (2000); EL ACCESO A LA JUSICLA EN AMEImCALATINA: RETos Y DESMiOS (Helen

Ahrens, Francisco Rojas Aravena, &Juan Carlos Sainz eds., 2015).
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the underlying causes preventing individuals from obtaining redress to their human
rights violations, including lack of information on the scope of their rights, economic
barriers such as lawyer and court's fees, excessive formalism, procedural delays and
geographical location of tribunals.'8 Furthermore, language barriers and the insufficient protection of the rights of minorities, including Afro communities and indigenous groups, and other vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities, children
or LGBTI persons constitute additional hurdles impeding full access to the right to
justice at the domestic level in the region."

2.2. Beyond pre-admissibility: Access to regional bodies
If a case is submitted to the regional machinery, access to a decision on the merits
may be thwarted even before the case reaches the admissibility phase. The fate of
access is mostly determined at the pre-admissibility stage in the European and InterAmerican system, but not so much so in the African system. It is estimated that in the
European system 90 percent of the applications received are inadmissible. 2 ' Likewise,
it is reported that of 17,466 petitions filed with the IACHR between 2002 and 2013,
only 10 percent were accepted to be reviewed for their admissibility.?
One important difference between the European and Inter-American systems is that
the right to individual petition under Article 34 of the ECHR has been interpreted as
requiring that all decisions be made by a judge and such decision has been considered
an integral part of the right to individual petition. 22 In contrast, there is no practice at
the Inter-American level ensuring that the right to individual petition involves review
at every level by the IACHR itself, a group of commissioners or even a commissioner
alone. Even if IACHR's Rules of Procedure have contemplated since 2 000 the creation
of a working group of admissibility made up of commissioners to study the admissi23
bility of petitions in between sessions, such a group has never become operational.
Therefore, the Executive Secretariat of IACHR is in charge of carrying out the initial
sifting of the petitions.

Roberto Gargarella, "Too Far Removed from the People." Access to Justice for the Poor: The Case of Latin
America, at 3-5, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/drivers urb change/urb-society/pdf_
violence-rights/gargarella-removed-from people.pdf.
19 See inter alia Marisa Ramos, Algunas consideraciones teoricasy practicas sobre el acceso a ]a justicia, in EL
ACCESOA LAJUSTICLA
EN AmIERcA LATINA: RETos YDESAFiOS 57 (Helen Ahrens, Francisco Rojas Aravena, &Juan
Carlos Sainz eds., 2015); David Lovat6n Palacios, Experiencias de acceso a la justicia en America Latina, 50
REVISTA IDH 22 7 (2009).
20 See in this regardhttp://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FilteringSectionENG.pdf.
2
Nelson Camilo Sanchez et al., El elefante en ]a sala. El retrasoprocesal en el sistema de peticiones individuales
en el sistema interamericano,Desafios del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Due Process of Law
Foundation, Septiembre 2015, at 243-244.
22 See CDDH Contribution to the Ministerial Conference Organized by the United Kingdom Chairmanshipof the
Committee of Ministers, adopted by the CDDH on February 10, 2012, 45, in Reforming the European
Convention on Human Rights, Interlaken, Izmir, Brighton and Beyond, Council of Europe, March 2014,
at 307.
23 See Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, art. 35.
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In the European system, the requirement that every application be registered and
reviewed by a judge resulted in increased caseloads and unreasonable delays for
responding to the applicants due to the inability of the ECtHR to deal with an ever
growing number of petitions that reached its peak in 2011.24 Consequently, additional measures were adopted to limit the number of cases proceeding to a judicial
formation.
First, the allocation of cases to a judicial formation is preceded by a "pre-allocation"
phase. The ECtHR has amended the rules on the lodging of applications, establishing
stricter requirements for an application to be considered "valid." 2 Failure to comply
with those requirements results in the application not being allocated to any court
formation for an admissibility decision, 26 unless in exceptional cases. 27 Moreover, the
application needs to be complete before the expiration of the six-month time limit 28 ;
otherwise, it will be rejected and the applicant will be prevented from arguing his
case again. 29 The number of cases finalized at this stage has steadily increased, from
11,650 in 2009"0 to 25,100 in 2014."' As stated before, in 2014, 56,250 cases were
32
allocated to a judicial formation.
The Single Judge formation, introduced to deal with large number of applications at
the first stage of the proceedings, 33 is complemented with a "filtering section" created
at the ECtHR's Registry to handle the cases from the countries with the great majority
of applications against them. 3" A single judge may declare a case inadmissible "where
such decision can be taken without further examination 3 5 ; in other words, to "clear36
cut cases, where the inadmissibility of the application is manifest from the outset."
The single judge is assisted by a non-judicial rapporteur assigned by the ECtHR's

24

See CDDH, Consolidated draft CDDHfinal report of the longer termfuture of the Convention system, GT-GDR-F

(2015)010, May 15, 2015, 62.
See Rules of the ECtHR, art. 4 7.
2'
Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Docunments/Report Rule 47 ENG.pdf.
27 The exceptions include: (i) when the applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the failure to
2s

21

29

comply; (ii) the application concerns a request for an interim measure; (iii) the court otherwise directs of
its own motion or at the request of an applicant. See Rules of the ECtHR, art. 47(5).
Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Docunients/Report Rule 47 ENG.pdf. Before January 1, 2014, it
was sufficient to send a letter establishing the substantive elements of the petition to interrupt the sixmonth time limit.
Id. The current practice requires that a full and complete application is filed before the six-month period

and the date of the dispatch is what counts toward meeting that deadline.
Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats-analysis-2009_ENG.pdf
31 Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats-analysis-2014_ENG.pdf.
32 See supra note 3.
33 Article 27, as introduced by Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, ETS No. 194, adopted on May
13, 2004 and entered into force on June 1, 2010.
34 This section was set up to follow up on the recommendations issued in the declaration resulting from the
High level Conference on the future of the European Court of Human Rights at Interlaken on February
18-19, 2010. See in this regardhttp://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Filtering-SectionENG.pdf
3s See ECHR, art. 2 7(1).
31 Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 6 7, availableat http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HtmI/194.htm.
30
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Registry, whose role is to provide a summary and analysis of the applications and justify their inadmissibility.3 If the single judge agrees with the non-judicial rapporteur,
he or she signs an approval sheet that is preserved at the Registry.3 The decision is
final 9 and there is no obligation to publish it. 40 The applicant whose case is found
41
inadmissible is notified through a standard letter stating the ground for rejection.
In most cases the reason cited to reject the application is that the petition does not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the ECHR.4 2 No further reasoning or justification is provided.43
In the Inter-American system, the initial assessment of the claims is done by the
Executive Secretariat of IACHR, which reviews the application for compliance with
the formal requirements needed for processing. In 2014, the Commission reported
that 1,039 petitions were rejected for processing at the initial stage and only 284 were
referred for an in-depth admissibility analysis. 44 If a petition does not meet the requirements, the Executive Secretariat may request that the petitioner satisfy them. 4 1 Ittakes
an average of twenty-seven months for the Secretariat to carry out an "initial review"
of the applications. 46 It is not clear if the petitioner is notified at the reception of the
application or if the first contact takes place after the initial review is completed.
A section within the Executive Secretariat (the "Registry") is in charge of processing all incoming petitions, determining whether "based on prima facie analysis," the
petitions establish a violation of a convention right, "whether domestic remedies have
been exhausted, and whether the requirements necessary to file the petition have
been satisfied."' 4 7 Thus, in practice, the Executive Secretariat has the power to reject
applications in limine on a procedural or substantive basis, including that the complaint does not present a violation, is manifestly groundless, or is out of order. There is
no available information regarding the decisions of those claims since the IACHR only
makes them available to the applicant. However, it is known that the practice of the
IACHR is to send a letter to the applicants rejecting their claim and basing its decision
only on the admissibility provision that has not been fulfilled by the petition, in other
words, without providing additional reasoning.
The practice in both the European and Inter-American systems of not providing
any reasoning to support the rejection of the applications, compounded by the lack

37 See CDDH Interim Activity Report, CDDH(201 1)R72, add. 1,
38 Id. 8.
39 SeeECHR, art. 2 7(2).

7.

40 See Rules of the ECtHR, art. 3 3(4).
41 See Rules of the ECtHR, art. 52A(1).
42 Janneke Gerards, Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Critiqueof the Lack of

Reasoning, HUM. RTs. L. REv. 6 (2014).
43 Id.
44 See IACHR, Annual Report 2014, supranote 7, ch. II, at 51.
4s The Rules also provide that if the Executive Secretariat has any doubt as to whether the requirements

referred to have been met, it will consult the Commission.
41 Initial review means the analysis carried out by the Secretariat to determine if the petition is not accepted

for processing.
47 See IACHR, supra note 44, ch. VI, Institutional Development and Administrative Affairs, at 670.
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of publication of the cases that are declared inadmissible, may raise important questions as to the fairness of the decision and the impossibility of assessing whether sufficient time consideration is provided to all the applications. 4 This problem has been
acknowledged by the Registrar of the ECtHR. 49 Also, in the Inter-American system
such lack of transparency has been criticized by civil society and academic institutions
since it gives the Secretariat excessive discretion and may involve a hidden obstacle for
access to human rights victims, particularly those who lack representation or are represented by organizations or professionals without expertise in the system. 5o Certainly,
when making an assessment of the IACHR's practice with respect to pre-admissibility
it is important to consider that this organ is a quasi-judicial body, whose members are
not full time and meet only three times a year for two regular sessions and one extraordinary session. Moreover, it is well documented that the IACHR is cash-strapped and
has been facing severe resource issues for most of its history.
Another issue regarding the handling of petitions at the pre-admissibility level that
it is worth mentioning is that both the ECtHR 5 ' and the IACHR 2 have adopted priority
or fast-track policies to expedite treatment of certain cases depending on the urgency
or systematic nature of the violations. The application of this rule has expedited the
treatment of urgent cases according to a set of categories created by the ECtHR and
also helped in addressing issues of a more systematic practice through the use of
pilot judgments or other procedural measures.5 3 In the Inter-American system, the
new rule authorizes expediting consideration of a petition due to the age or health
condition of the victim, the potential application of the death penalty, the relationship between the petition and precautionary measures already adopted in that case,
whether the victim is deprived of liberty, that there is an express intention of the state
to enter into a friendly settlement, or when the petition addresses a structural situation. The IACHR had already implemented these rules in practice before they were
included in its Rules of Procedure. 4 Notwithstanding the importance of this practice,
4' For a criticism of this practice and the subsequent consideration of cases rejected by the ECtHR and later

considered by the Human Rights Committee, see Gerards, supranote 42.
41 He stated that although giving further reasons to the single judge decisions could add to the workload

of the Court, his office is exploring options to provide more standardized justifications to these decisions, once the backload of these types of cases is dispensed of.Written Presentationby the Registrar of the
European Court of Human Rights, GT-GDR-F(201 5)15, September 6, 2014, at 2.
'o Centro de Derechos Humanos, Facultad de Derecho Universidad de Chile, Estudio: Acceso a ]a justicia en el
Sistema Interamericanode DerechosHumanos, at 26-27. Also, CEJIL, Policy Paper,Proposal to Improve the Inter
American System of Human Rights: CEJIL s Response to the PermanentCouncils Document, No. 6, at 14 (2012).
Article 41 of the Rules of the ECtHR provides: "Indetermining the order in which cases are to be dealt
with, the Court shall have regard to the importance and urgency of the issues raised on the basis of
criteria fixed by it. The Chamber, or its President, may, however, derogate from these criteria so as to give
priority to a particular application."
2 In 2012 the IACHR adopted a priority policy to process cases through the procedural rule of "per saltum."
See Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, art. 29.
See http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Priority-policy-ENG.pdf.
14 IACHR, Reply of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the PermanentCouncil of the Organization
of American States regarding the recommendations contained in the Report of the Special Working Group to
Reflect on the Workings of the IACHR with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System,
Oct. 23, 2012, 116, availableat http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/strengtheiiiiig/docs/RespCPEn.pdf.
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it may be asked whether the application of this policy would mean that only applications reflecting gross violations of human rights in certain states would be reviewed in
a reasonable time, 5 or reviewed at all.
In the African system, the ACHPR's procedure foresees a process of "seizure" preceding the consideration of the admissibility of complaints. As in the other systems,
cases are submitted to the Secretariat. The Secretary is responsible for a first screening of the complaint, to ensure that full contact information is on record, and that
information is provided with respect to the admissibility grounds.5 6 The Secretariat
must contact the complainant to supplement missing data. When the Secretary is
satisfied that the file contains all the necessary information, it is transmitted to the
ACHPR for its decision on "seizure." Once the ACHPR has decided to be "seized," the
complaint is sent to the state to provide its "observations on admissibility.""
An analysis of available information indicates that in practice the seizure procedure
has not been an impediment to access. For a long time, on the basis that the ACHPR had
not rejected complaints at the seizure stage, it seemed to be redundant, prompting calls
for the merger of seizure and admissibility (or, differently put, the abolition of seizure).
However, the ACHPR in 2013 adopted two formal decisions not to be seized. In the
first matter, submitted against the Democratic Republic of Congo, the responsibility
of the state was not established. The second matter, ostensibly brought on behalf of
the Kenyan President who at the time was indicted before the International Criminal
Court, invokes the responsibility of the Kenyan government to have more diligently
investigated the violence following a disputed election in 2007. In a finding resembling
an admissibility decision in both form and substance, the ACHPR decided not to be
seized on the basis that the complaint contained disparaging and insulting language.
It also mentioned that there was no indication of steps taken to exhaust domestic remedies; and that the complaint failed to reveal a prima facie violation of the AChHPR.
While these three factors all relate to admissibility criteria, the ACHPR added another
ground: It expressed the view that "for a Complaint of this nature, consent of the
Victims should have been sought" and should have been indicated by way of their
signatures. This case seems to reveal the true purpose of the seizure phase. Mindful of
the fact that the implication of an adverse seizure finding is that the complaint is never
brought to the state's attention, it would appear that seizure was designed to allow the
ACHPR to wash its hands of a politically contentious case.

2.3. Access to a decision on the merits
The principal potential barrier to obtaining a decision on the merits, once the case is
before the relevant body, is its admissibility. However, we also consider briefly the question of friendly settlement.

See in this respect the response to this issue by the Registrar of the Court, supra note 49, at 4-5.
Rules of Procedure of the ACHPR, r.93.
s7 Rules of Procedure of the ACHPR, r.105.
Pastor Key Mwand v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Comm. No.457/13 (Nov. 5, 2013); Uhuru Kenyatta
and William Ruto (represented by Innocence Project Africa) v. Republic of Kenya, Comm. No. 464/14
(ACHPR June 4, 2014).
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(a) Admissibility
In the European system, only a small percentage of cases are declared admissible. 9 In
2014, for example, of the 86,063 cases disposed of judicially, 83,657 (or 97 percent)
were declared inadmissible.60 In the Inter-American system, of the relatively small
number of petitions advancing to the admissibility phase, most are declared admissible. In 2014, for example, forty-seven (or 92 percent) were declared admissible, and
only four (or 8 percent) inadmissible. 6 ' The IACHR's practice of trusting the sifting of
petitions at an early stage to the Executive Secretariat largely explains both the low
number of cases reaching the IACHR and the small number of cases declared inadmissible after their full consideration.6 2 In the African system, a majority of the relatively small number of submitted cases are declared admissible. In 2014, for example,
73 percent of the cases under consideration were declared admissible.
Admissibility criteria are of three different types. The first type (such as the "exhaustion of domestic remedies" requirement) anchors the relevant treaty in international
law generally or arguably reflects the legitimate interests of states. The second type
(reflected in the "abuse of right" concept) depends on the behavior of the applicant.
The third, relating to the substance of the case itself, is potentially a real barrier to
access to a determination on the merits.
In ratifying the treaty, a state obviously accepts the obligations contained therein.
Therefore, there can be no objection to the rejection of applications ratione materiae.
Similarly, a state cannot be expected to be accountable for behavior not attributable to
the state (incompatibility ratione personae). Such a decision is not always free of controversy.63 These requirements are found in each of the three treaties. In the same category, although technically an issue of jurisdiction, is the requirement that the victim
(not the alleged perpetrator) must be within the jurisdiction of the state. The ACHR
and ECHR have such a requirement, but the AChHPR does not.64
The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies is also a general rule of international law, and is found in each of the three treaties. It has the potential to be a
barrier for applicants. Courts and commissions in all three systems have, through
their jurisprudence, ensured that strict formalism is not allowed to trump the interests of justice.65 One of the techniques to avoid formalism involves a shifting burden
'9

See generally DAVIDHARRIS ETAL., HARIls, O'BoYu, ANDWARBRICK: LAW OF THEEUROPEANCONVENTION
ON HUMAN

43 (3d ed., 2014).
These applications were declared inadmissible or struck out of the list by a single judge, a committee, or
RIGHTS

a chamber. See ECHR, Analysis of Statistics 2014, at 6, availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Stats-analysis_2014_ENG.pdf.
See IACHR, Annual Report 2014, supra note 7, ch. II, at 58.
2 Another potential explanation is that petitions that have been accepted for consideration by the Executive
Secretariat are left without being considered by the Commission due to the procedural backlog. See, in this
regard,Sanchez et al., supra note 21, at 244-245.
63 See, e.g., Behrami &Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Decision on admissibility (May 2, 2007), and
Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, App. No. 7816 6/01, Decision on admissibility (May 2, 2007).
64 See ACHR, art. 1; ECHR, art. 1.
See, e.g., Akdivar & others v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, Judgment (Merits) (Sept. 16, 1996); Velisquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras, I/A Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
63-66, Merits, Judgment of July 29, 1988. See also
Community Maya Kaqchikel de los Hornos and El Pericon and its members v. Guatemala, Admissibility,
Report No. 87/12, Petition 140/08 (IACHR Nov. 8, 2012),
33-34.
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of proof. In the first instance, it is up to the applicant to establish that he or she has
exhausted domestic remedies. If the state says nothing, that will be sufficient. If, however, the state provides evidence as to the existence of a genuine remedy, applicants
will then have to establish why it was not a genuine remedy or why, in the circumstances, they were not obliged to exhaust it. 66 Nevertheless, the requirement imposes a
significant burden on applicants. They have to pursue every avenue of appeal in relation to the remedy they have chosen, unless it would be demonstrably pointless. Much
may depend on the availability of legal aid at the domestic level. The requirement of
exhaustion of domestic remedies may be inevitable, legitimate, and reasonable, but
that does not prevent it from being a restriction on access. Another way is to take into
account the particular cultural characteristics of the applicants. For example, in the
case of indigenous peoples the IACHR has consistently stated that these communities must exhaust only those remedies that contemplate the particular characteristics,
either economic or social, of these groups "as well as their special situation of vulner6
ability, their customary law, values, uses and customs." 7
It is too early to determine the approach of the ACtHPR, but the ACHPR seem to
be following an approach similar to that of the other systems. In fact, the ACHPR
has given an even more purposive and generous interpretation than have the other
systems. 6 The ACHPR has consistently held that the requirement that "domestic
remedies, if any" need to be exhausted means that only remedies that are "available" (which can be pursued without impediment), "sufficient" (capable of providing
the required remedy), and "effective" (offering a real prospect of success) need to be
exhausted. 6 ' The ACHPR has even gone as far as exempting complainants from this
requirement in respect of systemic, widespread, and well-publicized violations, on the
basis that the purpose of the requirement (namely, that a state should have notice and
thus an opportunity to rectify the situation) had been served. 7
States may be argued to have a legitimate interest not to be required to defend the
same case repeatedly or in different fora, based on the principle of res judicata. The
related requirements of ACHR 7' and ECHR 2 are therefore unexceptionable. The
equivalent in the AChHPR 7 is drafted much more loosely.
66 See, e.g., Gustavo Giraldo VillamizarDuranv. Colombia, Admissibility, Report No. 99/09, Petition 12.335

(IACHR Oct. 29, 2009), 31; Velasquez Rodriguez, I/A Ct. H.R. (sen C) No. 4, 64.
67 Diaguita Agricultural Communities of the Huasco-Altinos and the members thereof v. Chile,
Admissibility, Report No. 141/09, Petition 415-07 (IACHR Dec. 30, 2009), 45; Opario Lemoth Morris
et Al. (Miskitu Divers) v. Honduras, Admissibility, Report No. 121/09, Petition 1186-04 (IACHR Nov.
12, 2009), 34; Kuna of Madungandi and Embera of Bayano Indigenous Peoples and their Members
v. Panama, Admissibility, Report 58/09, Petition 12.354 (IACHR Apr. 21, 2009), 37.
68 See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, So Far,So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in theJurisprudenceof the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003); FRANS VILIOEN,
INTERNATIONAL
HUxLN
RIGHTS LAW IN AFCA 323-329 (2012).
61 Jawara v. The Gambia, Comm. Nos. 147/95 and 149/96 (ACHPR May 11, 2000), 32.
70 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria,
Comm. No. 155/96 (ACHPR Oct. 2001), 38.
71 ACHR, art. 46(1)(c).
72 ECHR, art. 35(2)(b).
7' AChHPR, art. 56(7).
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While the need for legal certainty expressed in the requirement that legal action has to
be brought within certain time limits, is well accepted, the length of that period is a matter
of contestation. The ACHR and ECHR both require that the application be brought within
six months of the final domestic decision (or receipt of the notification of the decision), or
of the events said to constitute the violation where there is no domestic decision. The period
will be reduced to four months in the case of the ECHR when Protocol 15 enters into force.
While the other two treaties are rigid in stipulating a six-months time limit, their
African counterpart sets a flexible open-ended standard. 14 This difference seems to
make much sense, taking into account factors such as low levels of legal literacy; low
visibility and awareness of the regional system-particularly among African lawyers-and impediments in accessing domestic courts and a limited cohort of lawyers.
While these factors may be present in all parts of the world, their impact is exacerbated in Africa. Any trend of the ACHPR interpreting the "unreasonableness" standard that elevates the time periods in the two other systems to some form of a yardstick
for Africa should therefore be resisted. In a case against Zimbabwe, decided in 2008,
it observed: "Going by the practice of similar regional human rights institutions, such
as the Inter-American Commission and Court and the European Court, six months
seem to be the usual standard."" Although the ACHPR also states that it still adopts
a case-by-case analysis, it does appear that its previously more flexible approach has
become more rigid." Instead of taking into account all relevant factors in establishing
the reasonableness of the time period, the ACHPR now has reference to the period of
delay, and if it considers it as unreasonable, the onus seems to be placed on the complainants to show good and compelling reasons why the case had not been brought
earlier. This approach, which assumes the desirability of a period limit leaning toward
six months, is therefore an example of inappropriate and a-contextual cross-regional
interpretive borrowing. In subsequent cases, states have more routinely invoked this
requirement. A number of subsequent cases have been declared inadmissible on this
ground alone." Although some of the periods of delay are in fact quite excessive, the
risk now looms large that authoritarian governments may routinely convince the
ACHPR to adhere to a strict (and a-contextual) approach and thereby contribute to
the triumph of narrow formalism over substantive concerns.

74 ACHPR, art. 56(6).
71 Majuru v. Zimbabwe, (2008) Afn. Hum. Rts. L. Rep. 146 (ACHPR 2008) (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Lawyers for Human Rights v. Kingdom of Swaziland, Comm. No.414/12 (ACHPRJuly 24,2013),
43 (thirty-four months considered unreasonable); Article 19 and Others v. Zimbabwe, Comm. No.
305/05, (2010) Af. Hum. Rts. L. Rep. 126 (ACHPR 2010),
93-97 (twenty-four months considered
unreasonable); Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v. Republic of Sudan, Comm. 310/05, (2009)
Afn. Hum. Rts. L. Rep. 193 (ACHPR 2009),
75-80 (twenty-nine months considered unreasonable).
77 Priscilla Njeri Echaria (represented by Federation of Women Lawyers, Kenya and International Center for
the Protection of Human Rights) v. Kenya, Commun. No. 3 75/09 (ACPHR Nov. 5, 2011), 61 (thirtyone months considered unreasonable); J.E.
Zitha & PJ.L. Zitha v. Mozambique, Comm. No. 361/08
(ACPHR Mar. 3, 2011), 114 (thirteen years found unreasonable); Southern Africa Human Rights NGO
Network and Others v. Tanzania, Comm. No. 333/06 (ACPHR May 26, 2010), 76 (eleven years found
unreasonable).
76
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The second type of admissibility criteria involves the behavior of the applicant.
As far as the victim is concerned, an application will be declared inadmissible if it is
anonymous or an abuse of the right of petition. The ACHR refers to an application
being "obviously out of order" T and the ECHR refers to an "abuse of the right of individual application."" The AChHPR refers to the use of "disparaging or insulting language." 0 The inclusion of this requirement speaks to the stronghold of sovereignty
and the thin-skinned nature and sensibilities of those holding power in societies not
very open to rigorous criticism. It is regrettable that it has in a number of cases played
either a contributory or a determinative role in the ACHPR's decision to declare a case
inadmissible.8 ' A similar situation has, however, seeped into the European system,
through the ECtHR's interpretation of the "abuse of right" requirement. In a number of cases, the use of offensive language also leads to cases being declared inadmissible.8 2 However, the approach adopted is quite flexible and heavily influenced by
withdrawal of offensive remarks.s3
It is the third type of admissibility criteria that raises the greatest potential problem
for access. Under the ACHR, a petition has to be rejected if it is "manifestly groundless."81 4 Under the ECHR, it is inadmissible if it is "manifestly ill-founded." There is
no express equivalent under the AChHPR. Unlike the other two types of criteria, this
one is neither based on anchoring the applicable convention in international law
generally nor based on the applicant's behaviour. An otherwise admissible application is being denied a decision on the merits. Such a vague notion clearly gives the
regional machinery an apparently wide margin of discretion. Much depends on how
the phrase is understood. It is little help to know that it means the applicant must
establish a prima facie case. Under the ECHR, the former European Commission used
the criterion as a filter. In Powell v. Rayner, 6 the Commission delegate explained to the
ECtHR how the Commission used "manifestly ill-founded." He said that for "reasons
of judicial economy," they would find a case inadmissible where they thought the case
was arguable but where they were certain they would find no violation on the merits.
This enabled the Commission to avoid having to produce a report, while at the same
78 ACHR, art. 47(c).
79 ECHR, art. 35(3)(a).
'o AChHPR, art. 56(3).
11 See, e.g., Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de IHomme v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 65/92, (2000) Aft. Hum.
Rts. L. Rep. 61 (ACHPR 1997), 13; Ilesanmi v. Nigeria, Comm. 268/03 (May 11, 2005), 40.
2 See, e.g., Duringer and Others v. France, App. Nos. 61164/00 and 18589/02, Decision (ECtHR Feb. 4,
2003); Di Salvo v. Italy, App. No. 16098/05, Decision (ECtHR Jan. 11, 2007) (personal attack against
the government's representative and had used expressions that the Court considered to be insulting);
Milan Rehak v. Czech Republic, No. 67208/01, Decision (ECtHR May 18, 2004) (offensive language
used toward the Court and Registry, in which applicant sought to achieve widest possible circulation of
remarks). Contrast with Manoussos v. Czeck Republic and Germany, App. No. 46468/99 (ECtHR July 9,
2002) (case not declared admissible, because use of offensive language was rare in voluminous submission; and ceased after the applicant had been warned by the Registrar).
Chernitsyn v. Russia, App. No. 5964/02 (Apr. 6, 2006).
14 ACHR, art. 47(c).
1s ECHR, art. 35(3)(a).
86 Powellv. Rayner, App. No. 9310/81, Judgment (Merits) (Feb. 21, 1990).
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time finding that the state should have provided access to a domestic remedy to test the
claim. The ECtHR rejected the argument and stated that a claim that was manifestly
ill-founded could not be arguable (rather than finding that a claim that was arguable
could not be manifestly ill-founded).
Like the European system, the IACHR assesses whether a petition presents an apparent
or potential violation at the admissibility stage on the basis of a prima facie standard of
review 8 At this stage, the IACHR assesses whether there is a colorable or arguable claim,
leaving the determination on the actual existence of the violation to the merits.8 9 Also, on
the basis of the principle of procedural economy, the IACHR rejects those petitions that
it considers not to have a prospect of success.90 Moreover, the IACHR uses the "fourth
instance formula" to dismiss petitions in which this organ is called to substitute the
domestic authorities in the application of domestic law or the assessment of evidence. 9 '
The basic premise of the formula is that the IACHR "cannot review the judgments issued
by the domestic courts acting within their competence and with due judicial guarantees,
unless it considers that a possible violation of the Convention is involved."92
On the condition that the criterion of "manifestly groundless" or "manifestly illfounded" is only used where it is absolutely clear that there is no violation on the merits, it probably does not represent a barrier to good cases. It is important, however,
that if there is any doubt as to a violation on the merits, the case should be declared
admissible and be subject to further consideration.
The final admissibility criterion only exists under the ECHR. It is much newer and was
adopted in response to the crisis of the overloading of the Court. The application is to be
declared inadmissible where the victim has not suffered a "significant disadvantage." 93
That ground cannot be used where there has been no domestic consideration of the
issue. This qualification will be removed when Protocol 15 enters into force. The Court
can override this criterion where, in its view, respect for human rights requires it to do so.
(b) Friendly settlement
Friendly settlements are not per se an impediment to access. The goal of international dispute settlement is to resolve the dispute, not to provide a binding legal

87

Id. 33.

See, e.g., Community Maya Kaqchikel de los Hornos and El Pericon, I/A Ct. H.R., Admissibility, 44;
Rafael Rodriguez Castafneda v. Mexico, Inadmissibility, Report No. 165/11, Petition 492-08 (IACHR Nov.
2, 2011), 38.
See, e.g., Cristina Britez Arce v. Argentina, Admissibility, Report No. 46/15, Petition 315-01 (IACHR July
28, 2015), 50; Daniel Urrutia Labreaux v. Chile, Admissibility, Report No. 51/14, Petition 1398-05
(IACHRJuly 21, 2014), 25.
90
Rafael Rodriguez Castafneda, Inadmissibility, 44.
9' Rolando Ernesto Gomez Garcia y Bernarda Liliana G6mez Garcia v. Honduras, Inadmissibility, Report No.
121/12, Petition 764-03 (IACHR Nov. 13, 2012),
35-36; Luis Guillermo Bedoya de Vivanco v. Peru,
Inadmissibility, Report No. 45/04, Petition 369-01 (IACHR Oct. 13, 2004), 41; Edison Rodrigo Toledo
Echeverria v. Ecuador, Inadmissibility, Report No. 16/03, Petition 346-01 (IACHR Feb. 20, 2003), 38.
92
Marzioni vs. Argentina, Report No. 39/96, Case 11,673 (IACHR Oct. 15, 1996), 50.
91 Article 35(3)(b) of the ECHR. See also Dinah Shelton, Significantly Disadvantaged? Shrinking Access to the
European Court of Human Rights, 16 HuM. Ris. L. REv. 303 (2016).
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judgment. This is a diplomatic function rather than a judicial one. It is therefore
to be expected that the friendly settlement stage of a case will be confidential, even
if the rest of the proceedings are public. It is not surprising that, particularly in
the case of bodies established before human rights law had established itself as a
distinct field of international law, the settlement of cases should have assumed a
high priority.
However, if victims are somehow coaxed into settling cases, this procedure could
constrain access to justice in the form of a remedy based on a decision on the merits.
Inherent to this procedure is a risk that pressure would be put on the applicant. Given
that there is no guarantee that the applicant will win the case, he or she may feel
that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." On the face of the treaties, there
is no suggestion that human rights bodies should put pressure on applicants to settle.
Furthermore, the ACHR and ECHR, and the ACHR's practice, require that a friendly
settlement be based on respect for human rights. Nevertheless, it is not clear on whose
initiative this process hinges; in other words, whether the regional mechanism is simply a mouthpiece for the transmission of the offers of the parties or whether they are
expected to make their own proposal.
The question of friendly settlements made more sense as part of the original
European Convention regime, in which the primary goal of the former European
Commission on Human Rights was to effect an agreement between the parties. Being
conducted on the basis of confidentiality, such proceedings fit less comfortably into the
public justice regime of the ECtHR. While all proceedings before the Commission were
confidential, those before the ECtHR are public. Nevertheless, friendly settlement proceedings are confidential. 94 Following the merger of the Commission and Court, the
latter has assumed the friendly settlement function of the former.
There is no evidence suggesting that the ECtHR has coerced applicants to accept
friendly settlement proposals.95 However, given the need to ease its backlog, the ECtHR
has resorted more extensively to striking applications out of its docket through the
use of unilateral declarations. 96 Since unilateral declarations are proposed by states
after an attempt to settle a case has failed, if not properly regulated and consistently
applied, this instrument may be used to circumvent the wishes of the victims who cannot reject such declarations once the ECtHR has approved them.9
4 ECHR, art. 39(2).
But there is evidence that at least in areas of established case law, the ECtHR limits itself to refer the applicant a specific financial proposal to settle the case, without taking into account other measures of redress
beyond pecuniary reparation (Helen Keller &David Suter, Friendly Settlements and UnilateralDeclarations:
An Analysis of the ECtHr's Case Law After the Entry into Force of ProtocolNo. 14, in THE EUROPEANCOURTOF
HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER PROTOCOL 14-PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND PERSPECTIVES (FORUM EUROPARECHT

22) 55, 89

(Samantha Besson ed., 2011).
Unilateral declarations are mostly used to handle repetitive cases and the ECtHR has established guidelines to deal with sensitive or complex cases. See in this regard UnilateralDeclarations:Policy and Practice,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/UnilateraldeclarationsENG.pdf.
See in this regard a critical analysis to the use of unilateral declarations in non-repetitive cases and the
risks that this situation may present in Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, UnilateralDeclarations:The Need
for Greater Control, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 673 (2012).
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Under the ACHR, the IACHR places itself at the disposal of the parties to settle the
case. 98 The practice of the IACHR regarding friendly settlement has evolved throughout the years and these changes have been reflected in the different amendments to
its Rules of Procedure. 99 The 2013 amendment to those rules provide that a friendly
settlement may be initiated at any stage of the proceedings, including immediately
upon the submission of the petition.' 0 The process may continue only with consent
of the parties and the IACHR plays the role of facilitator of the negotiations.'' The
friendly settlement proceedings may be concluded if the IACHR "finds that the matter is not susceptible to such a resolution or any of the parties does not consent to its
application, decides not to continue it, or does not display the willingness to reach a
0 2
friendly settlement based on the respect for human rights."'1
Depending on the different composition of the IACHR, the process of friendly
settlements has been more or less instigated as a concerted effort to finalize pending
cases. 0 3 It has become very clear in the last few years that states care very much about
the friendly settlement proceeding and expect the IACHR to assume a more central
and active role in advocating for the amicable resolution of pending cases.' 0 4 If well
implemented, the IACHR's practice of friendly settlement shows that the resolution of
a case through that mechanism may ensure effective access to justice and reparations
for human rights victims.'0 5
If a friendly settlement agreement is reached between the parties, the IACHR issues
a report reflecting the facts of the case as well as the terms of such agreement, and
makes it public. 06 Once the friendly settlement report is published, the case cannot
be referred to the IACtHR in case of a state's lack of compliance. This presents a challenge for the petitioners because by consenting to an agreement, they risk the possibility that if the state fails to respect its commitments there are no legal avenues to
enforce such agreement. To improve that situation, the IACHR has established a follow-up mechanism to make an annual assessment of compliance with friendly settlement agreements and a public report of the outcome of such assessment.10 However,
to enhance reliance on this mechanism, the IACHR should either publish the report

98

ACHR, art. 48(l)(0).

99 See, in general, The Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.45/13

(IACHR
Dec. 18, 2013),
30-58 (describing the different amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR
regarding friendly settlement proceedings).
...Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, art. 40.
10 Id.
102 Id.
'03 Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure, supra note 96,
45-47, 55.
104 See, inter alia, Propuesta de Proyecto de Resolucion para el periodo extraordinario de sesiones de Ia
Asamblea General y Anexo: Medidas para Ia Aplicacion de las Recomendaciones contenidas en el Informe
del Grupo de Trabajo Especial de Reflexion sobre el Funcionamiento de Ia Comision Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos para el Fortalecimiento del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, OEA/
Ser.G, CP/doc.481 3/12 corr.1, Dec. 20, 2012, Seccion 4: Soluciones Amistosas, at 35-36.
'osImpact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure, supra note 99, ch. III.
1o6 ACHR, art. 49.
107 Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, art. 48.
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once the terms of the agreement are complied with or keep other legal avenues, such
as referral to the JACtHR, open with respect to cases in which the state fails to comply with its commitments.' 8 Measures such as those described above should prevent
states from abusing the mechanism as a political tool, while lacking a firm commitment to respect the terms of the agreement reached. The IACHR has acknowledged
that states have failed to comply, for example, with measures of investigation and
punishment of the perpetrators of human rights violations, indicating that only 21
percent of the agreements where these measures were accepted as part of the friendly
resolution of a case were actually fulfilled by the state. 9
Friendly settlements have not played a prominent part in the African human rights
system. On the one hand, friendly settlement in individual cases does not have a textual basis, as the AChHPR only requires friendly settlement in the context of interstate
cases." 0 Despite this lacuna, the ACHPR amicably settled a number of cases. On the
other hand, the ACtHPR has an explicit legal basis enabling it to seek an amicable settlement in any case before it,"' but it has so far not exercised this mandate. The notion
of friendly settlement before the ACtHPR is complicated by the fact that the ACHPR is
responsible for both facilitating friendly settlement, in respect of cases pending before
it, and appearing as a party before the Court (as, for example, in the Ogiek case before
2
the ACtHPR)."
A number of factors explain the surprising lack of prominence of friendly settlement in the African system, especially in the process before the ACHPR, given political
invocations of African cultural biases tilting toward conciliation rather than confrontation in dispute resolution. First, there is a small number of cases within the available pool of cases to be "settled amicably." Second, the relatively egregious nature of
violations, linked to the undemocratic nature or many regimes complained against,
may have left complainants unenthusiastic about the prospect of reaching such a settlement. Third, the complete lack of cooperation with governments, especially in the
earlier years when the ACHPR's practices were being established, largely precluded
the exploration of this possibility. Fourth, the lack of settled cases is also explained
by the lack of staff and resources at the level of the ACHPR's Secretariat, taking into
account that such a process may be protracted and labor-intensive, and depends in
large part on administrative support to communicate and follow up with the parties.

2.4. Access to second tier
Access to the second tier is premised on the understanding that access to a judicial
remedy is of greater (potential) benefit to litigants than quasi-judicial remedies. While
1o See

CEJTL, Policy Paper,supra note 50, at 22.
109 See Impact of the Friendly Settlement Procedure, supranote 99, ch. III,
11o ACHPR, art. 52.

137.

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court
on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 9.
.2 African Commission v. Republic of Kenya, App. No. 006/2012, pending consideration before the
ACtHPR.
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this assumption may be questioned, all three systems have evolved toward greater
judicialization. Three models exist for accessing the "second," judicial, tier: direct
access; indirect access; and a hybrid between the two.
In the European system, the hybrid system of a quasi-judicial commission and judicial court morphed into a single judicial avenue to the ECtHR when the Commission
became defunct in 1998. When it started, in 1950, the European system provided for
optional acceptance of both the right to individual petition (to the Commission) and
of acceptance of the ECtHR's jurisdiction. The Commission could only start examining cases in 1955, when six states had accepted the right of individual petition." 3 The
required eight states accepting the ECtHR's jurisdiction was only reached in 1958,
causing the Court to be established in 1959. In 1966, the United Kingdom became
only the second major European country, after Germany, to accept the ECtHR's jurisdiction. Initially, the Commission was reluctant to submit cases to the Court, but later
this became routine, culminating in the effective abolition of the Commission, with
Protocol 11 in 1994, which entered into force in 1998, allowing all individuals in all
state parties direct access to a single judicial institution.
In the Inter-American systems, only states and the IACHR may refer cases to the
IACtHR. Judicial justice is thus accessed indirectly, with the Commission acting as
gatekeeper. Initially, the IACHR exercised its discretion of referral very sparingly, and
few cases reached the IACtHR. Although the IACtHR had been in place from 1979, the
IACHR referred its first case (Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,which had been submitted to the Commission in 1981), to the Court only in 1986.1" From 2001, however,
with the introduction of a rebuttable presumption of referral,"15 most merits decisions
against states ended up before the IACtHR. In 2014, for example, the IACHR referred
nineteen cases to the IACtHR, 16 and published only three Article 50 reports (that is,
merits reports that were not referred to the Court)." 7 Even if some debates took place
in the early 2 000s regarding the adoption of a protocol granting individuals the right
to refer cases to the IACtHR, states never officially discussed this proposal.
The African system has elements of both of its predecessors. While, as a rule,
applicants may approach the ACtHPR only indirectly, via the ACHPR, direct access
to the Court is allowed, exceptionally, if a state makes a declaration to this effect." 8
The ACHPR thus controls indirect access, while direct access is in the hands of the
individual-provided the state has opened that door by making an optional declaration to that effect. By the end of 2015, of the twenty-seven state parties to the Protocol

Mikael Rask Madsen, The ProtractedInstitutionalizationof the Strasbourg Court: From Legal Diplomacy to
IntegrationistJurisprudence,in THE EUROPEAN
COURT
OFHUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN
LAWANDPouTics 42, 46 (Jonas
Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen eds., 2011).
114 Velasquez Rodriguez, I/A Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4.
.. Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, art. 45.
116 IACHR, Annual Report 2014, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 22.
7 Id., ch. II.
.. Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, art.
34(6). On the complementarity between the two institutions, see Annika Rudman, The Commission as a Party
Before the Court-Reflections on the Complementarity Arrangement, 19 POTCHEFSTROOMELECTRONIC
LJ. 1 (2016).
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to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, only seven have accepted direct access; and the four cases that the
ACtHPR has decided on the merits had all been submitted directly to this Court." 9 By
the end of 2015, the ACHPR had not yet referred any case to the ACtHPR after it had
taken a decision on the merits. Under its Rules of Procedure, it has a discretion, guided
only by the non-compliance (and unwillingness to comply) by the respondent State, to
do so. 12' The ACHPR has, however, submitted cases to the ACtHPR on other bases. 121

3. Access by whom?
This question is investigated with reference to the party alleging a violation (applicant) and the possibility of amici curiae. Although access issues also arise in respect of
NGOs, as well as the respondent and other states, these aspects are not covered in this
article, given our focus on individual access.
3.1. Applicant
Impediments to access may also be linked to the person or entity submitting the complaint. The practice of the three regional institutions varies with regard to who can
22
bring a case.
Answers to the question whether only the affected person (the "victim") may submit a case or whether groups-based cases may be submitted differ across the three systems. A fortiori, a group of individual victims can submit a communication on behalf
of the wider group to which they belong. While this logic has been followed in the
African system, it is less fully accepted in the other two.
Under the AChHPR, a communication can be submitted by groups (as "peoples")
and by a person or group that is not itself the victim of the violation (in the public
interest, actio popularis). The ACHPR's decision in Social and Economic Rights Action
Center and another v. Nigeria (the Ogonilandcase),' 23 which dealt with the responsibility of the Nigerian government for oil pollution by the Nigerian National Petroleum
Company, was based on a case brought by two NGOs, one based in Nigeria and one in
the USA. These NGOs did not purport to be direct or indirect "victims" of the alleged
violation; neither did they claim to represent a distinct or identified group of affected
persons (a "class"). The admission of this case therefore illustrates the unequivocal
acceptance by the ACHPR of cases submitted in the public interest (actio popularis).
Mtikila v. Tanzania, App. Nos. 9 and 11/2011, Judgment ACt-PR June 14, 2013); The Beneficiaries of
the Late Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso, App. No. 013/2011, Judgment (ACtHPR Mar. 28,
2014); and Konat6 v. Burkina Faso, App. No. 4/2013, Judgment (ACtHPR Dec. 5, 2014).
120 Rules of Procedure of the ACHPR, r. 118(1).
121 See, e.g., African Commission v. Libya (Provisional Measures case), App. No. 4/2001, Order for Provisional
Measures (Mar. 25, 2011), 25; and African Commission v. Libya (Gaddafi's son case), App. No. 2/2013,
Order for Provisional Measures (Mar. 15, 2013), 15.
122 See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts and
Commissions, 3 6 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 911 (2010).
123 Social and Economic Rights Action Center, Comm. No. 15 5/96.
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The acceptance of an actio popularisis in line with textual framework of the AChHPR,
which guarantees collective (peoples') rights as justiciable rights.
Under the ECHR, the notion of "victim" requires complainants to show that they are
directly affected by the measure or practice complained of. 24 Indirect victims, namely,
those "whom the violation would cause harm or who would have a valid and personal
interest in seeing it brought to an end,' 2 may also lodge an application to the ECtHR.
While the ACHR appears to focus on the victim, it is possible for an individual to
bring a case on behalf of his or her community, on the condition that the applicant
is also a victim. So far the IACHR has avoided dealing with the collective nature of
indigenous communities that have claimed violations to their collective rights by concluding, at the admissibility stage, that the victims in the cases were the individual
members of the community, 26 or the community and its members as long as they were
an identifiable group of individuals. 2 1 However, the IACtHR in the Kichwa Indigenous
People of Sarayaku case seemed to have gone further by recognizing their rights "as collective subjects of international law and not only as members of such communities or
peoples.' 2 At the stage of determining redress, the IACtHR also considers redress for
the affected community and not just the individual.
Even if access to the Inter-American system seems very broad and has been compared to an "actio popularis," the Commission and the Court have established that petitions in abstractcannot be processed. 29 Both organs have stated that petitions lodged
with the IACHR must identify a victim of the alleged violations or, under certain conditions, a potential victim.' 30 The IACHR has defined potential victim as an individual
who "is at imminent risk of being directly affected by a legislative provision."131
The ECtHR, by way of contrast, focuses entirely on the individual victim. It does
allow an individual to represent family members, either in addition to the applicant
or where the applicant is the next of kin of a deceased or seriously disabled family
member. An applicant cannot, however, bring an application on behalf of a group of
people. That not only prevents the use of the ECHR for actio popularis claims but also
prevents an individual bringing a case on behalf of all the members of his community. Even if actio popularisis not accepted in the European system, potential victims,
defined as those who have a demonstrated likelihood of being affected by a violation,
24 ECtHR, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, 14 (2014), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/

Documents/Admissibility-guideENG.pdf.
Id.
121 Indigenous Community Yakey Axa of the Enxet-Lengua People vs. Paraguay, Report No. 2/02, Petition
125

12313 (IACHR Feb. 27, 2002),

31.

127 Xaxmok Kasek Indigenous Community vs. Paraguay, Admissibility, Report No. 11/03, Petition 322/01

(IACHR Feb. 20, 2003),

29.

12s Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, I/A Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245,

231, Merits and

Reparation, Judgment of June 27, 2012.
129 Emerita Montoya Gonzalez v. Costa Rica, Admissibility, Report No. 48/96, Case 11,553 (IACHR Oct. 16,
1996), 28; Maria Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Admissibility, Report No. 28/98, Case 11625 (IACHR
Mar. 6, 1998, 31); Mario R. Chang Bravo v. Guatemala, Petition 283-06 (IACHRJuly 24, 2008), 39.
130 Emerita Montoya Gonzalez, Case 11,553, 28-29; Maria Morales de Sierra, Admissibility, TT 31-35.
"I Maria Morales de Sierra, Admissibility 35.
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may file a complaint. 3 2 In principle, victims who choose to be represented must provide a duly signed power to a representative to act on their behalf' 33 Some exceptions
apply, particularly in regard to victims who alleged violations to fundamental rights
such as, inter alia, the right to life or to human treatment, in which case filing by a
third party may be accepted. "34
' Where an individual test case is brought, it has consequences for all those similarly situated, 3' thus mitigating the effect of the prohibition
of actio popularisclaims. Historically, the inability to bring communal claims has not
been a problem, but it has increasingly become so, as cases have been brought from
societies functioning more on a communal basis.
3.2. Amici curiae
All three systems allow amici curiae to make representations despite the silence in
the foundational texts on this issue. The fact that this procedure was only included in
subsequent procedural or operational rules speaks to the growth of interest by an ever
broadening of accessibility in these systems. The ECtHR lacked any statutory basis
allowing for amicus briefs until 1983, when its revised Rules permitted the Court's
president, in the "interest of the proper administration of justice," to invite other
36
states (not parties to the dispute) and "any other person" to submit comments.
Protocol 11 clarified and codified the applicable rules in relation to amicus curiae submissions by opening up possibilities where the president of the ECtHR may invite, or
grant leave, to anyone concerned other than the applicants to submit written comments or, in exceptional cases, participate in the hearings. 31 Initially, the IACtRH's
Rules only implicitly allowed for amicus briefs.' 3 Later, the position was formalized
and made explicit. 39 The Rules also specifically allow for amicus briefs during proceedings for monitoring compliance and provisional measures. 4' Although the Rules of
Procedure of the IACHR do not clearly outline the applicable rules in relation to the
4
participation of amici curiae, the IACHR generally welcomes their participation.' '
The ACHPR's 2010 Rules of Procedure authorize the Commission to admit "any other
42
person" to make presentations during oral hearings in individual communications.
Before 2010, some AChHPR provisions were in the absence of an explicit legal basis
interpreted to allow the ACHPR to accept amicus curiae submissions. 43 Also the

32 ECtHR, Practical Guide, supra note 124, at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id.
13 See, e.g., Dudgeon v.United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (se. A) No. 45,
134

66- 68, App. No. 752 5/76, Judgment
(Oct. 22, 1981).
131 1983 Rules of theECtHR, r. 37(2).
137 ECHR, art. 3 6(2), and Rules of the ECtHR, r. 44.
131 1980 Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR, art. 34(1).
139 See Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR, art. 44.
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales), et al. v. USA, Report No. 80/11, Case 12.62 6 (July 21, 2011), 13.
142 Rules of the ACHPR, r. 99(8).
143 ACHRP, arts. 46, 52.
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ACtHPR, although not explicitly mandated to allow amici, can do so on the basis of
44
its competence to obtain information or hear "any person" other than the parties.
A trickle at first, the submission of amicus briefs has increased markedly over the
years in the European and Inter-American systems, but remains very limited in the
African. Because of the complexity and novelty of the cases that reach the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR, the rate of participation of amici is particularly high in relation
to cases decided by this Chamber. 1 45 According to a 2009 report, leave to intervene by
way of written submissions to the ECtHR is almost always granted. 46 The IACtHR has
an even more extensive "amicus practice" than its counterpart in Europe. 141It appears
that the IACtHR has never rejected an application to submit amicus curiae briefs. So
4
far, cases before the IACtHR attracted an abundance of amicus curiae submissions.1
Although only a handful of cases before the ACHPR have seen the participation of an
amicus curiae, 1 49 judging by the meager data so far, their role before the ACtHPR may
be more pronounced. 50

4. Conclusion
To explain the limited extent to which legal disputes are crystallized from a much
larger universe of invisible, unquantifiable lower-layer "proto-disputes,"'' sociolegal
scholars developed the notion of the "dispute pyramid." We use an adjusted version
of this notion to describe regional access. Starting at the broad base of disputes that
could potentially be referred (with respect to which domestic remedies had been or
need not be exhausted), the pyramid narrows toward its apex, as progressively fewer
and fewer cases are (i)
actually submitted, (ii) survive the pre-admissbility screening,
and thereafter (iii) are declared admissible, culminating in only a minuscule number
of cases reaching the "top": (iv) decisions on the merits.
As the Table 1 below shows, access differs tremendously across the three systems,
with the major stumbling blocks to access presenting themselves at different stages.
As mentioned, the pyramid depicting regional access has a very broad base, representing the pool of potential cases. Of these, around 100,000 or more cases are submitted

"I Rules of the ACtHPR, r. 2 7(3), 45(1).
141Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practiceof Human Rights NGOs Before the
European Court of Human Rights, 31 NETHERLANDS
Q.Hum. Rs. 271 (2013).
141JUSTICE "To assist the Court: Third party interventions in the UK" (2009) 46 http://2bquk8cdew6l92tsu4l
laySt.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/To-Assist-the-Court-26-October-2009.pdf
147Dinah Shelton, The Participationof Non-Governmental Organizationsin InternationalJudicial Proceedings,
611 AM. J.INT'LL. 638 (1994).
141See, e.g., Application before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Karen Atala and
daughters (Case 12.502) v. Chile (IACHR), http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.502ENG.pdf.
141Frans Viljoen &Adem Abebe, Amicus CuriaeParticipationBefore Regional Human Rights Bodies in Africa, 22
J. AFRICAN L. 32 (2014).
ISOSee, e.g., Konat6 v.Burkina Faso, App. 4/2013, where a group of more than ten NGOs collectively submitted an amicus brief; see also 141 and 143 of the judgment.
"I Felstiner, Abel, &Sarat, supra note 10, at 632.

184

I-CON 16 (2018),161 186

Table 1. Regional access.*
European**

Inter-Americant

Africantt

Cases submitted (in

> 100,000

1,758

45

2014)
Cases surviving

65 (i= 103, 800 of

21.5 (n= 284of

80 (i= 39 of 49)

pre-admissibility
screening (% of

160,600)

1,323)

cases considered in
2014)
Cases declared
admissible (%of

2.8 (n= 2,388 of
86,063)

92 (n=47 of 51)

73 (n= 24of 33)

cases considered in
2014)
*The data presented here may be challenged for its accuracy, but in our view even minor differences of opinion on the data would not alter the bigger picture.
**Data from ECtHR, Annual Report 2014, availableat http://echr.coe.int/Documents/AnnuaI Report_2014_
ENG.pdf (last visited February 15, 2018): pre-admissibility: 25,100 disposed of administratively, 78,700
rejected/declared inadmissible without full consideration and judgment by single judge, 900 by Chambers,
4,100 by committees; leaving the latter group of 5,000 out, it is a total of 103,800; allocated to a judicial
formation: 56,300 (together with 500), is a total of 56,800; in other words, a total of 160,600 is arrived at
by adding 56,800 and 103,800. Of a total of 86,063 applications adjudged in 2014, judgments delivered on
2,388 admissible applications; 83,675 decisions on inadmissibility/struck out; thus, 2,388 of 86,063 (2.8
percent) cases declared admissible.
IData from IACHR, Annual Report 2014, supra note 7: 1,323 decisions whether to process, with 284 decisions
to process (thus, 21.5 percent of considered cases proceeding beyond pre-admissibility phase); four inadmissibility reports, forty-seven admissibility reports (thus, 92 percent of cases-forty-seven of fifty-one-considered for admissibility declared admissible).
tData of the Commission's 15th Extraordinary Session (EOS) (Mar. 2104); 16th OS Ouly 2014); 17th OS
(Feb. 2015) is also included, because the 56th Ordinary session did not take place, due to the Ebola outbreak
in West Africa; and 55th Ordinary Session (April-May 2014) has been used: a total of forty-nine cases were
considered, of which ten were not seized or rejected due to a lack of diligent prosecution (thus, thirty-nine
cases (80 percent) proceeded beyond the pre-admissibility phase); thirty-three cases were considered for
admissibility, of which twenty-four (or 73 percent) were declared admissible.

to the ECtHR in any particular year; in the Inter-American system, in 2014, 1,758
petitions were received. By way of sharp contrast, the ACHPR over the same period
recorded only forty-five new submissions.
In the European system, many applicants approach the ECtHR, but very few end up
with a decision on the merits. A high percentage of cases (in 2014, 65 percent) proceeds to the admissibility phase, but very few cases (around 2.8 percent of cases that
made it to this stage in 2014) are found to be admissible, and are thus considered on
the merits. Even though the number of initial petitioners in the Inter-American system is much smaller, most of these cases are weeded out at the pre-admissibility phase,
by the Secretariat of the IACHR. Only some 21. 5 percent of submitted cases proceeded
to the admissibility stage in 2014. Perhaps predictably, a high percentage of cases that
proceed to be considered by the IACHR are declared admissible (92 percent in 2014),
and lead to findings of violations against states. After some hesitance on the part of
the IACHR to refer cases to the IACtHR, currently, almost all cases decided by the
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Commission are referred to the Court. In the African system, the greatest constraint
to regional access lies in the small number of submissions, to begin with. The number
of cases arriving at the doorstep of regional mechanisms is so small because the pool
of cases decided domestically is so tiny. A significant percentage of cases received survive pre-admissibility screening (in 2014, 80 percent), and are declared admissible (in
2014, 73 percent). No case on the merits has yet proceeded from the Commission to
the Court by way of referral from the ACHPR.
Major impediments to domestic legal recourse largely account for the limited number of contentious cases decided by the African human rights system, but these factors are also-perhaps to a lesser extent-present in States making up the other two
systems. The victim may not have access because the issue at hand is not regarded as
appropriate for formalized judicial resolution at the domestic level. In other words, the
overwhelming majority of people in Africa have no real access to the African machinery for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with the admissibility conditions
or the provisions of the AChHPR.
Steps therefore need to be taken to improve domestic implementation, to increase the
chances of the problem being corrected at the domestic level. That requires a range of
measures to be undertaken, starting with the effective mobilization of civil society to
create greater awareness and provide accessible legal services. It is vital that international human rights machinery should not drown under the weight of cases submitted. The solution cannot be to consistently circumvent the exhaustion of the domestic
remedies rule. Even if there are exceptions, these exceptions should not themselves
become the rule. If domestic courts would as a matter of course be circumvented, the
regional institutions would become "courts of first instance," causing domestic courts
to be eclipsed, and opening the regional system to charges of displacing democratic
accountability and deliberation. Under the principle of subsidiarity, it is-in the first
place-at the national level that regional guarantees have to be brought home, and
implemented.
Our study shows that the level of regional access can only partly be attributed to
the interpretation of the admissibility criteria. The admissibility criteria, which might
constitute a significant barrier to access to the regional machinery, do not generally
appear to do so in practice. The relevant bodies have largely taken seriously the admissibility criteria but have not been overly formalistic in their application. To a significant
extent, this is attributable to the flexible way in which the commissions and courts
have interpreted the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Still, in the
European system, the criteria of "manifestly ill-founded" and "no significant disadvantage" contain the potential for abuse on account of the wide discretion they leave
to judges. In the African system, even more so than in other systems, admissibility
criteria have for many years not been applied restrictively. However, this trend seems
to be somewhat reversed, recently, with the declaration of some cases as inadmissible,
based on an a-contextual importation of the six-month rule as a quasi-standard.
The evolution of all three systems seems to suggest an inevitability toward greater
judicialization, not only in the normative frameworks but also in their use. Still, as
much as there is a common trend, the systems remains distinct, with direct access to
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a single judicial institution (the ECtHR); direct access to a quasi-judicial and indirect
access to a judicial institution (the IACHR and the IACtHR); and direct access to a
quasi-judicial body, and both indirect and direct access to the judicial tier (ACHPR and
ACtHPR). It is, however, questionable if an evolution toward greater judicialization
necessarily enhances individual access. Arguably, the European system functioned
better when there was a commission that had the most important role in decisions
on admissibility and fact-finding, and a separate court, which concentrated principally on the decisions on the merits and just satisfaction. In the Inter-American system, the Commission may have better knowledge of the background of the factual
circumstances because it may have been involved in engaging with states, conducted
studies, undertaken on-site visits, and so on. In the African system, the need for the
Commission's promotional activities is still very pronounced. This article identified the
lack of rights awareness at the domestic level as a major cause of the paucity of cases
submitted to the ACHPR and the ACtHPR. Because the determinants of this state
of affairs are deep-seated, and likely to persist for a considerable length of time, the
ACHPR, with its ambition of cultivating rights awareness and understanding, needs
to remain in place for the foreseeable future. In fact, the ACHPR has in the recent past
prioritized its promotional mandate with the effect of neglecting the complaints procedure. It is also possible that increasingly judicialization would render friendly settlements less common.
The overall impression is that progressive interpretations have steered all three systems toward greater individual access. In almost every respect possible, the machinery
has overcome potential impediments of textual omissions and deficiencies to allow
for an ever broadening pattern of accessibility in these systems. One common constraint relates to resources. The duration of time of sessions and the part-time or fulltime tenure all have an impact on access, and largely depend on available resources.
However, resource constraint should not be used deliberately to deny access to human
right machinery altogether, and should not be an excuse for increasing restrictions
on access.
Our analysis provides a picture of the present position on regional access to justice,
informed by the past. The length of time for which an institution has existed and the
nature of the early caseload makes a difference to its evolution. Just because a particular system lacks a certain feature does not mean that it will not do that in, say, twenty
years' time. Access is fluid and evolves over time.

